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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

VENUE: FLORIDA REJECTS SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
FirstamericaDevelopment Corp. v. News-Journal Corp.,
196 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1967)
Petitioner, a Florida land corporation located in Broward County,
brought a five million dollar libel action in the Circuit Court for
Dade County against respondent, a Volusia County newspaper publisher. Petitioner alleged the the cause of action accrued in Dade
County by the circulation there of a series of respondent's articles
charging the corporation with dishonest advertising practices in the
sale of land in Volusia County. Respondent contended that Florida
Statutes, section 46.04,1 permitted venue to be laid only in Volusia
County where the libel originated. The circuit judge held the action
could be brought in Dade County, but the Third District Court of
Appeal reversed.2 The Florida Supreme Court accepted certiorari of
the case as involving a question of great public interest and HELD,
venue of the cause could be laid in Dade County at plaintiff's option
since a cause of action accrues in every county into which the newspaper circulated the alleged libel. Judgment reversed.
A cause of action for libel consists of unprivileged publication of
defamatory material to a third party.2 Circulation of newspaper libel
logically gives rise to a cause of action for every reading, since publication occurs each time the defamation is read. This concept, known
as the "multiple publication rule," was developed at common law, 4
and has been adopted by several United States jurisdictions with
respect to venue of libel actions.5 The effect of the "multiple publication rule" is to give the person libeled a cause of action in every forum
in which the newspaper is read.
The "single publication rule" is a fiction developed by courts to
require that all causes of action for multiple publication of the same
libel be combined in a single action.6 This concept is codified in the
Uniform Single Publication Act,7 which has been enacted by legis1. FLA. STAT. §46.04 (1965).
2. News-Journal v. Firstamerica Dev. Corp., 181 So. 2d 565 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1966).
3. PROssMR, TORTS §106 (3d ed. 1964).
4. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
5. Buck v. James McClatchey Publishing Co., 105 Cal. App. 248, 287 Pac. 364
(3d D.C.A. 1930); Vicknair v. Daily States Publishing Co., 144 La. 809, 81 So. 324
(1919); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court, 129 Okla. 210, 264 Pac.
154 (1928); Hanks v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 149 W. Va. 552, 142 S.E.2d 727
(W. Va. 1965).
6. Note, The Single PublicationRule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1949).
7. 9C UNIFORM LAws ANN. 171.
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latures in seven states.8 The single publication idea has also been
applied in situations involving statutes of limitations, to set the time
at which a cause of action arises. 9 In recent years, some courts have
used this rule to determine questions of intrastate venue that turn on
identification of the situs of the tort.10 Under the multiple publication
rule of venue, the plaintiff has the marked advantage of choosing a
forum in which political, social, economic, or religious mores or prejudices are propitious, even though such forum may have no material
relation to the litigation. To prevent plaintiffs from enjoying such
unconscionable choice of venue, the jurisdictions adopting the single
publication rule have held that the act of publication occurs at the
place where the newspaper is first printed and generally circulated,
and that additional circulation in other counties increases the damages, but does not alter the place of the forum.11
The status of the "multiple publication rule" in Florida was at
best vague prior to the holding in the principal case. One decision
held that a cause of action for trademark infringement accrued in
every county in which the offending product was distributed, and
that venue could be laid in any of these counties.:2 This interpretation of the venue statute is analogous to the multiple publication
concept. A contrary result was reached in Eberhardt v. Barker, 3 a
criminal libel prosecution, in which the defendant newspaper publisher was held amenable only in the county where the libel was composed and first published. Double jeopardy was the ostensible ground
which precluded prosecution in any other county in which the libel
was circulated, but it is noteworthy that this protection would prevent multiple prosecutions regardless of which county tried defendant
first. The important teaching of this case is that newspapers are considered most naturally accountable for libel in the county of first
8. Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §12-651 (1956); California, CAL. Crv. CODE
§§3425.1-.5 (Deering 1960); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§6-702 to -705 (Supp. 1965);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 126, §§11-15 (Smith-Hurd 1965); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§40-17-30 to -35 (1953); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §14-02-10
(1960); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§2090.1-.5 (Supp. 1966).

9. E.g., Ogden v. Assodation of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C.
4 N.Y.S.2d 640

1959); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211,

(1938), af'd mem., 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
10. E.g., Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193
(1921); Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395 (1964);

O'Malley v. Statesman Printing Co., 60 Idaho, 326, 91 P.2d 357 (1939); Forman v.

Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943); Litzinger v.
Pulitzer Publishing Corp., 356 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1962).
11. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193, 197
(1921).
12. Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So. 2d 311 (Ist DC.A. Fla, 1963).
13. 104 Fla. 535, 140 So. 633 (1932).
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publication. In Eberhardt, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the
"single publication rule" as applicable to criminal venue under section 11, Declaration of Rights, of the Florida Constitution, which provides in part that the accused shall be tried "in the county where the
crime was committed .. " Both of the above decisions are factually
distinguishable, but serve to illustrate the lack of binding precedent
for the present case.
The applicable Florida venue statute provides that a domestic
corporation may be sued ". . . only in the county ...where the cause
of action accrued ....,14The terms of this statute control the issue
of venue, and must be construed to prevent venue from being "hauled
from county to county like a sack of potatoes." 15 This statute is
phrased in the singular, and apparently contemplates only one county
in which venue can be properly laid when based on the accrual of
the cause of action. This strict construction is inconsistent with the
multiple publication idea that the same cause of action may accrue
in several different counties.
There are serious constitutional questions which inhere in a multiplicity of suits against a newspaper for one intrastate libel,16 and
the court in the instant case conceded the soundness of limiting a
plaintiff to one all-encompassing cause of actionY.1 The court nonetheless declined to rule on this issue, limiting itself to deciding that
Dade County venue was proper.,' The necessary implication of the
decision, however, is that a cause of action accrues in every jurisdiction into which the defendant circulates its newspapers. This is the
only ground upon which Dade County venue can be predicated.
Neither the decision nor the statute creates any limitation on the
number of suits which a plaintiff may bring under such a "multiple
publication rule."
The court could have avoided this potential multiplicity of actions by interpreting the venue statute to require that the cause of
action can properly accrue in only one county. Under such a construction, it is reasonable to assume that the county in which the
alleged libel originated would be considered the most appropriate.
The court held this interpretation restrictive, and concluded that a

14. FLA. STAT. §46.04 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
15. Richard Bertram & Co. v. Barrett, 155 So. 2d 409, 412 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1963).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §13. Cf. Ross v.
Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950), which held that the preservation of American democracy depends on keeping the press free from "unreasonable restraints."
17. 196 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1967).
18. Id. at 104. Plaintiff-petitioner stipulated that it would bring only one
suit, so the issue of multiple suits was not squarely presented.
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cause of action could accrue in any county of plaintiff's choice from
those in which the libel was circulated.
It is a general principle of law that venue statutes are construed
to insure that "litigation be instituted in that forum which will cause
the least amount of inconvenience and expense to those parties required to answer and defend the action."'19 The particular forum
chosen by petitioner in the present case bore no material relation to
the cause of action. Neither party maintained a place of business in
Dade County, and circulation of respondent's articles there at the
time in question was admittedly "limited." 20 The substantive issue
in the suit was the fitness of Volusia County land for its advertised
purposes, and trial in Dade County made it highly impractical for
the jury to view the land. Respondent incurred extra expense and
inconvenience in defending the suit over two hundred and fifty miles
from its principal place of business. It is apparent that the size of
the damages sought by petitioner bears relation to its selection of
Dade County, which is reputed to render the highest tort claim
awards in the state. 2" In many states, and in federal courts, a party
required to defend under these circumstances would have recourse
to the forum non conveniens rule by which the trial judge has discretion to change venue. 22 The Florida venue statute makes no such
provision for change of inappropriate venue, 2 3 and so the multiple
publication doctrine leaves the Florida press at the mercy of plaintiff's caprice.
19. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 146 So. 2d 609, 612 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
20. 196 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1967) (respondent stipulated an average daily
circulation in Dade County of 143 issues during the time of the questioned
publication).
21. 1 BELLS, MODERN DAMAGES §74, at 371-72 (1959) states that in the early
1950's "Miami took her place beside San Francisco, New York, and Chicago as
one of the largest award centers in the United States," and that "most of the
large Florida awards have been obtained in the state court in Miami." The
five highest tort claim awards in Florida listed by Belli were brought by Dade
County juries. 6 BELrS, DAMAGE §296 (1963). The highest award for libel
returned by a Florida state court jury came from Dade County. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) ($100,000).
22. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964). "The court,
upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where: (I) the county
designated for that purpose is not a proper county; or (2) there is reason to
believe than an impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county; or (3) the
convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by
the change." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw §510 (McKinney 1963).
23. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So. 2d 576 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961);
Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, 124 So. 2d 708 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss4/4

4

Cobb: Venue: Florida Rejects Single Publication Rule

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

CONCLUSION
2 -4
Since the "multiple publication rule" is now law in Florida,
it is incumbent on the legislature to amend the venue statutes to
preclude "forum shopping" and multiple suits by plaintiffs. The
following provisions afford alternative legislative remedies:2 5
To prevent harassment of the press or communications media by
multiple suits, this provision is recommended:

(1) No person shall have more than one cause of action in this
state for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or
any other tort founded upon a single publication or exhibition
or utterance, such as any one issue of a newspaper or book or
magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one
broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a
motion picture. Recovery in such action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all the counties
of this state.
(2) A judgment in any other jurisdiction on the substantive
merits of any action for damages grounded upon a single publication or exhibition or utterance as described in section (1) shall
bar any other action for damages in this state by the same plaintiff against the same defendant founded upon the same publication or exhibition or utterance.
The above provision would require a single cause of action, but
would not determine the venue of that action. The following clarification of the venue statute is recommended to preclude unconscionable choice of venue by plaintiffs:
(3) A cause of action criginating in this state against a mass
communication medium for libel or slander or invasion of privacy shall be deemed to have accrued at the time and place of
the first publication or exhibition or utterance in this state, such
as the county in which a book or newspaper was first printed and
generally circulated or the county from which a radio or television
program was broadcast.
The above section would expressly overrule the "multiple publication rule" in Florida as applicable to venue and the statute of limitations. In the event that this is deemed undesirable, the following
provision is recommended to permit judicial limitation on plaintiffs'

24. The decision in the present case was followed in Drummond v. Tribune
Co., 193 So. 2d 183 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
25. These provisions are adapted from the Uniform Single Publication Act.
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exploitation of the forum selection advantage of the "multiple pub28
lication rule: "
(4) The trial judge shall have discretion to transfer any civil action to any other county or district where it might have been
brought:
(a) for convenience of parties and witnesses; or
(b) to make sources of proof or a view of physical premises
in litigation more accessible; or
(c) on good cause shown as the ends of justice require to prevent unconscionable and inappropriate selection of venue.
The above provisions are essential to give Florida communications media the protection from inconvenient forum which the venue
statute was intended to provide and to arrest the specter of multiple
suits for single publications.
THOMAS C. COBB

26. This section is an expansion of the Federal Venue provision, 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a) (1964).
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